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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that to 
apply Maryland Rule of Evidence 
5-404(b), the absence of mistake 
exception regarding evidence of 
other acts or crimes, the defendant 
must make some claim or raise the 
defense that the crime for which he 
or she is on trial was committed by 
mistake. Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 
307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998). 
Furthermore, the crime or act 
committed by mistake must be the 
same crime or act for which he or 
she is on trial. In this case, the 
absence of mistake exception did 
not apply because the defendant 
did not claim he committed the 
crime charged, housebreaking, by 
mistake; he only claimed he 
received stolen goods by mistake, 
which was not the crime for which 
he was on trial. Therefore, the 
court opined that the State illegally 
entered evidence of the 
defendant's past housebreaking 
convictions. In so concluding, the 
court reaffirmed Maryland Rule 5-
404(b) by limiting the State's use 
of prior crimes and barring the 
State from attempting to expand 
the application of the rule. 
As a result of breaking into 
five separate dwellings, James 
Othel Wynn ("Wynn") was 
charged with various offenses 
involving five different victims. 
The State prosecuted the offenses 
in three separate trials in the 
Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County. At the first trial, the state 
did not present absence of mistake 
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evidence, and Wynn was acquitted 
of all charges. At the second trial, 
Wynn was tried for crimes against 
victims Michael Maples and 
Charles Garrison ("Garrison"). 
The State presented evidence of 
past crimes committed by Wynn, 
and he was convicted. The third 
trial, in which evidence of past 
crimes was also admitted, involved 
charges for crimes against victim 
Michael Quigley ("Quigley"). 
Admittance of evidence from the 
third trial was the only issue 
presented before the court of 
appeals. 
At the third trial, Wynn's 
attorney, as a preliminary motion, 
moved in limine to exclude 
evidence of the Maples and 
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Garrison housebreakings. Before 
the defendant was able to argue the 
basis for his motion, the court 
allowed the State to proffer its 
argument in favor of allowing the 
evidence. The State argued that 
since Wynn claimed to have 
innocently purchased the property 
stolen from Quigley's home at a 
flea market, the defendant implied 
that he obtained Quigley's 
property by mistake. The State 
further argued that because Wynn 
implicitly raised the issue of 
mistaken possession, the evidence 
of other crimes should have been 
allowed to show the absence of 
mistake, pursuant to the exception 
in Rule 5-404(b). The trial court 
agreed with the State and allowed 
evidence of the Garrison 
housebreaking. 
At trial, asserting that he never 
raised the mistake of defense, 
Wynn objected to the State calling 
Garrison as a witness. The court 
overruled the objection and 
allowed Garrison to describe the 
housebreaking and theft of his 
residence. During the defense's 
case, Wynn himself did not testify, 
but offered evidence that he 
purchased the items taken from 
Quigley'S residence at a flea 
market without knowing the goods 
were stolen. At no time did Wynn 
claim he entered Quigley's home 
or that he committed a 
housebreaking by mistake. Wynn, 
in fact, claimed he did not commit 
the crime at all. Wynn was 
convicted of all charges and 
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appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, where the 
conviction was affirmed. 
The issue before the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland was whether 
the trial court properly allowed the 
State to use evidence of prior 
crimes pursuant the absence of 
mistake exception of Rule 5-
404(b). Wynn, 351 Md. at 316, 
718 A.2d at 592. The court began 
its analysis by exammmg 
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-
404(b) which sets forth, in part, 
that evidence of prior crimes, 
wrongs, or acts shall not be offered 
to prove character or to show 
conformity with the crime charged 
unless the purpose of the evidence 
is to show absence of mistake. !d. 
The court then reviewed under 
what situations the absence of 
mistake exception is applicable. 
Id. at 325, 718 A.2d at 597. Most 
relevant to the instant case, the 
court noted, is the scenario 
involving a defendant who admits 
to committing the crime, but 
claims to have done so by mistake. 
Id. The State may then offer 
evidence of other similar crimes as 
proof that the defendant did not 
accidentally or mistakenly commit 
the charged offense, thereby 
showing the absence of mistake. 
Id. 
In further determining the 
proper application of the absence 
of mistake exception, the court 
examined case law from Maryland 
and other jurisdictions, including 
Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 
A.2d 1080 (1977). Wynn, 351 Md. 
at 326, 718 A.2d at 597. The court 
in Hoes held that where a 
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defendant does not raise mistake as 
a defense, but does argue facts that 
could be construed as mistake, the 
court may apply the absence of 
mistake exception. !d. (citing 
Hoes, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 
1080). The defendant in Hoes was 
charged with assault with attempt 
to maim while using a shotgun. 
Id. at 326, 718 A.2d at 597. 
Asserting a defense of mistake, 
Hoes claimed that the shotgun 
accidentally misfired, but, since 
Hoes had shot the same victim 
several years prior to the trial at 
issue, the court permitted the State 
to use the prior crime to show 
absence of mistake. Id. (citing 
Hoes, 35 Md. App. at 62,368 A.2d 
at 1082). The court, however, 
distinguished Hoes from Wynn. 
Unlike Hoes' assertion that he shot 
the victim by mistake, the crime 
for which Hoes was on trial, Wynn 
claimed that he never entered the 
Quigley house, not that he entered 
the Quigley house by mistake. Id. 
The court then cited Emory v. 
State, 101 Md. App. 585,647 A.2d 
1243 (1995), in which evidence of 
absence of mistake was not 
admissible. Wynn, 351 Md. at 
327, 718 A.2d at 598. In Emory, 
the court rejected the application 
of the absence of mistake 
exception, finding that the 
defendant did not raise mistake as 
a defense in that he did not argue 
that his alleged involvement with 
the crime charged was a mistake. 
Id. (citing Emory, 101 Md. App. at 
608,647 A.2d at 1255). 
The court also cited McKinney 
v. State, 82 Md. App. 111, 570 
A.2d 360 (1990), in which the 
defendant ambiguously hinted 
towards the defense of mistake, 
but never asserted one. Wynn, 351 
Md. at 328, 718 A.2d at 589. The 
court in McKinney held that 
without an assertion of a mistake 
defense and no evidence from 
which such a defense may be 
inferred, there is "no material fact 
to be established by the other 
crimes evidence," and therefore, 
the absence of mistake exception 
does not apply. Id. (citing 
McKinney, at 125, 570 A.2d at 
367). 
A proper application of 
absence of the mistake exception, 
the court explained, is found in 
State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156, 
900 P.2d 284 (1995). In Brogan, 
the defendant allegedly violated a 
state statute by having wild elk on 
his farm. Wynn, 351 Md. at 328, 
718 A.2d at 589. Asserting a 
defense of mistake, Brogan 
claimed that the elk mistakenly 
came onto his property when he 
left his gate open. Id. at 329, 718 
A.2d at 599. In allowing evidence 
of prior crimes and bad acts, the 
court in Brogan held that the 
evidence was relevant to show 
absence of mistake. Id. 
Based upon its comprehensive 
review of prior case law, the court 
held that for the absence of 
mistake exception to apply, "the 
defendant generally must make 
some assertion or put on a defense 
that he or she committed the act 
for which he or she is on trial, but 
did so by mistake." Id. at 330-31, 
718 A.2d at 599-600. In so 
holding, the court found that the 
absence of mistake exception did 
not apply in the present case. Id. at 
331,718 A.2d 600. First, the court 
determined that Wynn did not 
assert that he entered Quigley's 
home by mistake, but rather, that 
he never entered Quigley's 
residence. Id. Thus, the court 
concluded, Wynn did not raise the 
defense of mistake to the crime 
charged. Id. Second, the crime 
Wynn claimed to have mistakenly 
committed was receiving stolen 
goods, not housebreaking or theft, 
the crimes for which he was tried. 
Id. at 332, 718 A.2d at 600. 
Therefore, the crime or bad act 
committed by mistake was not the 
same crime or bad act for which 
the defendant was on trial. !d. 
Thus, in the instant case, the court 
reasoned that the State should have 
been precluded from introducing 
evidence of prior housebreaking 
convictions at trial. Id. 
The court's holding in Wynn v. 
State restricts the use of evidence 
of past crimes against a defendant 
by specifically outlining under 
what circumstances the absence of 
mistake exception applies. 
Evidence of prior acts is highly 
prejudicial toward defendants as 
juries may conclude "once a thief, 
always a thief." Further, where 
evidence is presented that a 
defendant committed a similar 
crime or act in the past, juries may 
conclude that he or she must have 
committed the crime for which he 
or she is presently being tried. 
Therefore, safeguards such as the 
elements set forth by the court 
protect the defendant by keeping 
the jury focused on the current 
trial. If, however, the defendant 
opens the door by asserting the 
defense of mistake to the crime 
charged, he is risking the 
introduction of prior similar crimes 
even with a limiting instruction. 
Defense attorneys need to carefully 
weigh whether using the defense 
of mistake is prudent where the 
defendant has been previously 
convicted of similar crimes. 
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